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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

THE EFFECT OF THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CODE
UPON THE UNIFORM BUSINESS CORPORATIONS ACT
JENNNGS P FE=Ix

The Federal Constitution provides that Congress shall have the
power to establish uniform bankruptcy laws.' This does not deprive
the states of their power to enact insolvency laws but merely suspends
the operation of such laws where enforcement would conflict with the
Federal Act.2 Whether an insolvency statute is considered a bankruptcy act depends on whether the debtor is given an absolute discharge.8 The whole of the state act or merely the discharge portion
may be invalid depending upon whether its other sections are inseparably interlaced with the discharge provision.' If the highest court of
the state declares its discharge provisions suspended (courts often say
void) but the rest of the act valid, no federal question is presented.'
The Uniform Business Corporations Act provides for dissolution
of a corporation' when its liabilities exceeds its assets" (bankruptcy) at
the instance of (i) a shareholder (voluntary petition), (2) a judgment creditor, or (3) a creditor whose claim has been admitted (involuntary petitions) 8 The trustee is then empowered to wind up the
corporation, collect all debts, convert the assets into cash, and pay all
claims according to their respective priorities.9 This dissolves the corporation, 9 and thus, in effect, absolute discharge of the corporate
debtor has been accomplished without full payment of its debts. Moreover, except by specific statute, individual shareholders are not personally liable for corporate debts by virtue of the corporate entity
doctrine.1 Thus, it is submitted, it logically follows that the force of
at least the above sections of the Uniform Business Corporations Act
1 U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 4, Hanover Nat. Bank v. Moyses, 186 U. S. 181
(1902).
2 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat 122 (U. S. 1819).
8
Boese v. King, 108 U. S. 379 (1882), Armour and Co. v. Becker, 167 Wash.
245, 9 P.(2d) 63 (1932).
4 Meyer v. Hallman, 91 U. S. 496 (1875).
5 In re Tarnowski, 191 Wis. 279, 210 N. W 836, 49 A. L. R. 686 (1926),

Pobreslo

v. Boyd
Co., 287 U. S. 518 (1932).
8
REm. REV. STAT. §§ 3803-48 to 3803-56 [P P C. §§ 446-1 to 446-17].
7 Id., § 3803-50a [§ 446-5a].
8 Id., § 3803-51 [§ 446-7].
9 Id., § 3803-52 [§ 446-9].

101 Id., §§ 3803-49, 50 [§§ 446-3, 5].

2 Flink v. Paladim, 279 U. S. 59 (1929), In re Koke Co., 38 F.(2d) 232 (C. C. A.
9th, 1930), STEVENS, CORPORATIONS § 16 (1936).
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has been suspended " except in instances where the Federal Act is not
applicable. In construing a similar statute, the Supreme Court of the
United States in In re Watts 8 stated:
And the operation of the bankruptcy laws of the United States cannot be
defeated by insolvent commercial corporations applying to be wound up
under state statutes. The Bankruptcy law is paramount in its field.
The above contention is of course limited to the provisions of state
laws which predicate dissolution upon insolvency The administration
of decedents' estates is not a valid analogy 1 ' There the occasion giving
rise to the administration of the estate is an act of God normally
beyond human control. Under the Washington Business Corporation
Act and like statutes the corporation or its creditors initiate the proceedings, solely because of the bankrupt condition of the debtor corporation. There seems to be no persuasive answer to the argument
that: (z) Congress can exclusively govern the dissolution of bankrupt corporations," (2) it has done so,"8 and thus (3) the field is
exempt from state control.
Cases holding that a receiver could be appointed under the.state law
and could proceed with dissolution, prorating assets, and so forth"
and that such was merely an act of bankruptcy subject to being set
aside within four months, merely beg the question. It is the state law
itself which is suspect, not action taken thereunder. The regulatory
provisions of the Corporations Act presumably would not be affected
although the Washington court in Armour v. Becker,"8 Tacoma Grocery Co. v. Doersch,' and Anderson v. Zelensky "° held the whole of
the Washington Assignment For the Benefit of Creditors Act" invalid,
drawing no distinction between the regulatory and discharge provisions. 2 The proposition that the Uniform Business Corporations Act
is in part a bankruptcy act is of importance in analyzing its impact on
12 Hammond et al. v. Lyon Realty Co., 59 F.(2d) 592 (C. C.A. 4th, 1932), Continental Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Superior Court of San Francisco, 163 Cal. 579, 126
Pac. 476, 479 (1912), see also 5 REMMINGTON ON BANIRUPTCY § 2071 (5th ed. 1936).
Is 190 U. S. 1, 27 (1902).
14 Hammond et al. v. Lyon Realty Co., 59 F.(2d) 592, 593 (C. C. A. 4th, 1932).
25Sea cases cited 5 REmmINGTON ON BANKRUPTCY 124 (3d ed. 1923) and DRYER,
SUPREME COURT BANKRUPTCY LAw 129 to 149.
16 U. S. C., TrmE 11, c. 3,. § 1, cl. 1, ci. 23 and § 22.
'17Roberts Cotton Oil Co. v. F E. Morse & Co., 97 Ark. 513, 135 S. W 334
(1911) , sea also State ex raL Strobl v. Superior Court, 20 Wash. 545 (1899).
18 167 Wash. 245, 9 P. (2d) 63 (1932).
19 168 Wash. 606, 12 P.(2d) 929 (1932).
20 170 Wash. 137, 15 P.(2d) 934 (1932).
21 REm. REV. STAT.
22

§§ 1086 to 1103 [P P C.§§ 642-1 to 642-33].

CoMpare, International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U. S. 261 (1928).
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the prior corporate receivership statute" which has no discharge provision. In the opinion of the writer the pertinent provision of the
latter statute is sufficiently inconsistent with the receivership section
of the Uniform Act to be mutually exclusive. Without the complicating
federal factor, the Uniform Business Corporations Act should be held
to repeal the antecedent receivership statute by implication.
The Federal Bankruptcy Act only suspends the operation of the
state insolvency law where Congress has pre-empted the field; therefore any function of the state law outside the federal scope should
not be affected. For example, the Bankruptcy Act does not cover
amounts under $i,ooo.2 ' The receivership-discharge provisions of the
Uniform Act, as do all statutes, have two functions: (i) the affirmative
or substantive function, and (2) the negative or repealing action upon
prior inconsistent statutes. The latter would be affected by the Bankruptcy Act no more than if it had been express. Only the affirmative
function has been suspended and only as to amounts of $i,ooo or
over. Thus the rational conclusion must be that: (i) the prior corporate receivership statute," subsection 5, is repealed, and (2) that
the receivership provisions of the Uniform Corporations Act2" are
suspended.
Caveat: The Washington court in the Becker case," supra, held
that a creditor's acts under the Assignment for the Benefit of Creditors Act2" were "invalid" because of the discharge provision, even
though the amount concerned was under $5oo and thus without the
scope of the Bankruptcy Code. From that decision it is arguable that
the Washington court feels that federal action in this field not only
"suspends" but "invalidates" or "repeals" the offending state law, a
position which, it is submitted, is erroneous.
THE ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS IN APPELLATE BRIEFS
HAEXY R. VENABLES AND JOHN VEBLEN
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Few subjects have troubled courts more and legal writers less than
faulty assignments of error. Since the subject has received little atten28 REm. REV. STAT. § 741(5) [P P C. § 91-3(5)].
24
U. S.C., TrrLE II, c. 3, § 22.
25

REem. REv. STAT. § 741(5) [P P C. § 91-3(5)].

20 Id., §§ 3803-48 to 3803-56 [§§ 446-1 to 446-17].
27 167 Wash. 245, 9 P.(2d) 63 (1932).

28 REM. REv. STAT. §§ 1086 to 1103 [P P C. §§ 642-1 to 642-33].

